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Abstract 
In all human cultures, people gesture iconically. However, the evolutionary basis of iconic 
gestures is unknown. In this study, chimpanzees and bonobos, and 2-and 3-year-old children, 
learned how to operate two apparatuses to get rewards. Then at test only a human adult had 
access to the apparatuses and rewards. Children frequently produced appropriate iconic 
gestures but, with the exception of one human-raised chimpanzee, great apes did not gesture 
iconically. However, chimpanzees pointed to a reward outside the apparatus in another 
experimental condition, showing their motivation and ability to communicate with the human 
to request it. They also manipulated a duplicate apparatus in appropriate ways, though it was 
unclear if they did this to communicate with the human. Although great apes may have some 
of the prerequisite skills involved, iconic gestures come naturally to humans in a way that 
they do not for great apes.   
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Human communication is unique. Most obviously, only humans communicate using 
linguistic conventions that differ among different cultural groups. But, in addition, humans’ 
natural gestures of pointing (and other deictic gestures) and pantomiming (and other iconic 
gestures) are human universals (Kita, 2003) and have been claimed to be species-unique 
modes of human communication (Tomasello, 2008).  
The most basic of humans’ natural gestures would seem to be pointing, which human 
infants typically begin doing before they have produced much, if any, conventional language 
(Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998). Although great apes (henceforth apes) do not point 
for one another in their natural environments, apes in captivity do point for humans – 
typically whole hand hanging in mesh caging in the direction of a desired object – to 
request/demand food (e.g., Leavens & Hopkins, 1998; Leavens, Hopkins, & Bard, 1996; 
Leavens, Hopkins, & Thomas, 2004). They even point to tools that the human needs to have 
in order to fetch them food (Bullinger, Zimmermann, Kaminski, & Tomasello, 2011; Call & 
Tomasello, 1994; Zimmerman, Zemke, Call, & Gómez, 2009). 
But iconic gestures are another story. Iconic gestures are in many ways more similar to 
linguistic conventions than is pointing because even though they need not be conventional 
they are symbolic. (Following Piaget and many others, we refer to iconic gestures [as well as 
realistic drawings, sculptures, symbolic play, etc.] as ‘symbols’ and to the elements of a 
natural language and some conventionalized gestures as ‘signs’, which are symbolic by 
convention only.) For example, an airport security guard might twirl his finger in the air to 
indicate that the passenger should turn his body around, or one worker might gesture with a 
hammering motion to another worker across a construction site to request that a hammer be 
brought to him. The distinguishing feature of an iconic gesture is that through its resemblance 
to the intended referent it is meant to symbolize some action or object. Although it has not 
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been studied nearly as much as pointing, several studies have found iconic gesturing in young 
children (e.g., McNeill, 1992; Nicoladis, Mayberry, & Genesee, 1999; Özçalişkan & Goldin-
Meadow, 2011; So, Demir & Goldin-Meadow, 2010; Stefanini, Bello, Caselli, Iverson & 
Volterra, 2009). However, little is known about young children’s ability to create novel iconic 
gestures on the spot to instruct others about how to use a novel apparatus (see Behne, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, in press, for one recent study on this). 
Tanner and Byrne (1996) have claimed that some captive gorillas sometimes use 
iconic gestures with one another (see also Savage-Rumbaugh, Wilkerson, & Bakeman, 1977, 
for an example in bonobos). In contrast, Pika and colleagues found no iconic gestures in 
gorillas or bonobos (Pika, Liebal, & Tomasello, 2003, 2005). One problem with an 
interpretation of the observed gestures based on iconicity is that almost all the reported 
examples involve one individual moving its arms in the direction in which she supposedly 
wants the other to move her body, and these could easily have different origins. That is, in the 
series of studies reviewed by Call and Tomasello (2007), one process by which great apes 
learn their gestures is posited to be ontogenetic ritualization. Applied to the gorilla examples, 
one could imagine that the first gorilla initially actually grabbed the second gorilla and 
attempted to move her body in the desired direction. Then, across repeated instances of this, 
once the second gorilla came to recognize what the first was attempting to do, she went ahead 
and moved in that direction as soon as the first gorilla began to initiate her attempt. This led 
the first gorilla to abbreviate her attempt into a shortened act (not a symbolic representation of 
an act or an object, as in iconic gestures). Although this ontogenetic ritualization explanation 
also fits other data on gorilla gestural development (e.g., Gómez, 1990) and what we know 
about other aspects of great ape cognition and communication, the fact is that at this point we 
do not know which interpretation of these observations of gorilla gestures is the correct one. 
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The aim of this study was to directly compare children and apes in the same task by 
investigating the use of iconic gestures experimentally. We tested 2- and 3-year-old children 
because studies using natural observations of children in their homes show that it is around 
this age that there is a spurt in children’s production of iconic gestures (e.g., Özçalişkan, 
Gentner, & Goldin-Meadow, in press; Özçalişkan & Goldin-Meadow, 2011). We tested 
chimpanzees and bonobos because they are humans’ closest living primate relatives and they 
are capable of spontaneously developing pointing gestures and learning to communicate with 
humans using languages based on lexigrams or American sign language (Gardner, Gardner, & 
Van Cantfort, 1989; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986). We gave both children and apes the 
opportunity to use novel iconic gestures in highly motivating circumstances. After subjects 
learned how to operate two different apparatuses requiring different manipulations, the 
situation was that a human experimenter had access to one of the apparatuses but the subjects 
did not. In the key condition (Necessary), the apparatus had inside it a desirable reward, but 
the experimenter seemingly did not know how to extract it. Assuming that the experimenter 
would share the reward if she retrieved it, it was in the interest of the subjects to show her 
how to manipulate the apparatus so as to extract the reward with an iconic gesture. In another 
condition (Unnecessary) the reward was set in front of the apparatus so that all the subjects 
had to do was to direct the experimenter’s attention to it in some way (e.g., by pointing), with 
iconic gestures being unnecessary. Based on previous studies, our prediction was that young 
children would gesture in both ways – iconically when that was needed, and deictically when 
that was needed. We also predicted that children would use iconic gestures much more often 
than apes, who might not use them at all (although the apes would be expected to point when 
the reward was in front of the apparatus). In addition, in order to give subjects another way to 
tell the experimenter how to manipulate the apparatus, in some trials subjects had available a 
Iconic gestures  6 
 
duplicate of the apparatus which they themselves could potentially manipulate. This way we 
could test whether, if they did not gesture iconically, apes could still provide similar 
information to the experimenter with physical support. 
 
Study 1: Children 
Method 
Participants 
 Sixteen children, 8 2.5-year-olds (mean age = 2;7;18, range = 2;6-2;9) and 8 3.5-year-
olds (mean age = 3;7;9, range = 3;6-3;9) participated. Three additional children were tested 
but dropped from analyses for not participating in the second day of testing (one 2.5-year-old) 
and experimenter error (two 3.5-year-olds). There were equal numbers of boys and girls at 
each age. Participants were recruited from a database of parents who had volunteered to 
participate in child development studies. 
 
Materials and set-up 
 All children were presented with two different apparatuses made out of transparent 
Plexiglas. Each held a marble and it was the child’s task to get the marble out. One of the 
apparatuses was a tube which could be rotated to the left or right so that the marble inside 
would fall out (see Figure 1a). The other was a box which had to be pushed to one side so that 
the marble became reachable (see Figure 1b). Both apparatuses automatically resumed their 
initial position when no physical force was being applied. During the test phase, the 
experimenter and child were separated by a mesh screen, which prevented the child from 
reaching the apparatuses and the rewards during the test. 
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------------- 
Figure 1 
------------- 
Design 
 There were two experimental conditions:  the unnecessary condition, in which the 
marble reward was easily available for the experimenter who was helping children at test (it 
was out in the open in front of the apparatus), and the necessary condition, in which the 
marble reward was inside the apparatus and the experimenter who was helping children 
seemingly did not know how to get it out of the apparatus. There was also a baseline period 
immediately prior to each of the tests, during which another experimenter (the ‘baiter’, see 
below) was present but ignoring children and thus not available to help children get the 
reward. 
 Children were tested on two days within one week, with two sessions per day (with a 
10-minute break between sessions). All children participated in both experimental conditions 
with each of the two apparatuses, for a total of 16 trials (two trials on each apparatus in each 
of four sessions). The order of conditions and apparatuses was counterbalanced, with the two 
trials on each apparatus blocked, and the order of the presented apparatuses switched on the 
second day. In the second and third sessions a duplicate of each apparatus was fixed on 
children’s side of the mesh, to give them the opportunity to demonstrate directly on the 
apparatus how the helper could obtain the marble, in case they did not gesture iconically. For 
these two sessions, the side that these apparatuses were on was counterbalanced within and 
across sessions.  
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  Procedure 
After warming up with both experimenters (the ‘baiter’ and the ‘helper’) in a waiting 
room, children accompanied the experimenters to a testing room, where they were introduced 
to a chute that made a musical sound when marbles were dropped into it. The marbles rolled 
into a closed box children could not open, so they could not get them out again (this was done 
to keep children motivated to obtain further marbles). After placing two marbles into the 
chute, the helper told children she had an earache, and the baiter suggested that she wear 
headphones. The purpose of the headphones was to reduce verbal communication by children 
with the helper. To demonstrate that the helper could not hear with the headphones on, the 
baiter attempted several times unsuccessfully to speak with her loudly, finally getting her 
attention only by tapping her on the shoulder.  
The helper, with the headphones on, went behind a large opaque screen (so she could 
not see how the apparatuses worked) while the baiter introduced each apparatus in turn (tube 
first) to children. The baiter pointed out that there was a marble inside, and children were 
allowed to try to get it out, with verbal – but never gestural – help from the baiter if needed. 
Before moving on to the test phase, children successfully had to get three marbles out of each 
apparatus consecutively and put them into the chute. At this point, the apparatuses were on the 
floor in front of the mesh screen from the child’s perspective. 
Then the baiter put the apparatuses away briefly and children received three helping 
trials, designed to show children that the helper was willing to help them. For each of these 
three trials, the baiter moved to the other side of the mesh screen from children and placed a 
marble on a small piece of cloth (to keep it from rolling) on the table. She then said that she 
needed to write something down and busied herself at this, ignoring children for 30 seconds. 
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Then the baiter left and the helper appeared and immediately gave the marble to children, 
regardless of children’s previous or current behavior, to show them her willingness to give 
them the reward. 
Then, for each test trial the baiter placed one of the apparatuses (which one was 
counterbalanced) on the experimenters’ side of the table and put a marble either in front of the 
apparatus on the table (unnecessary condition) or inside the apparatus (necessary condition). 
For the baseline period she then busied herself writing for 30 seconds, ignoring children. This 
baseline period was designed to see how communicative participants’ gestures were, that is, 
whether children would produce them even when there was no one on the receiving end. She 
left and the helper returned for the test. The helper, still wearing headphones, asked children, 
“What should I do now?”, pretending not to see the marble. Her next actions depended on the 
condition and how children reacted. In the unnecessary condition, if children pointed to the 
marble she gave it to them after 30 seconds. If children did not point to the marble she waited 
for 30 seconds without giving the marble. In the necessary condition, if children pointed to the 
marble she demonstrated that she was unable to reach it, repeated “What should I do now?” 
(with a hands palm-up gesture to express her ignorance) and waited 60 seconds for children to 
gesture iconically, or to manipulate the corresponding duplicate apparatus on their side if it 
was present. If children did not act in any relevant way in this condition, after 10 seconds the 
helper began to try to manipulate the apparatus unsuccessfully. If children did not react at all, 
after a total of 30 seconds the helper left and went back behind the large screen. If children 
started acting (pointing, gesturing, or manipulating the duplicate apparatus), the helper stayed 
for a total of one minute.  
In order to receive the marble in the necessary condition, when no duplicate 
apparatuses were available, children had to produce a clear iconic gesture. That is, for the tube 
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apparatus they had to make a circular or semi-circular motion in a vertical plane, and for the 
box apparatus they had to move a body part (e.g., hand, finger(s), arm, head, leg) horizontally 
to either the left or the right side. When the duplicate apparatuses were available they had to 
either produce a clear iconic gesture or manipulate the corresponding apparatus in a correct 
and obvious way, that is, turn the tube more than 90° or push the box out. If they did not 
receive the marble, the baiter took it out when she returned and did not give it to children.  
After two trials with one apparatus (one trial in each condition), the baiter switched the 
apparatuses for two further trials with the second apparatus. Then they took a break (during 
which the baiter and child played with unrelated toys) while the duplicate apparatuses were 
either put up or taken down from children’s side of the mesh. The second session of each day 
began with the three helping trials. On the second day, the entire procedure was repeated. 
 
Coding and analyses 
Videotapes of the response period (i.e., when the helper was inside) were used for the 
coding of three main behaviors: iconic gestures, apparatus manipulations, and pointing.  Both 
iconic gestures and manipulations of the corresponding duplicate apparatus were coded 
following the same criteria the helper used to determine how to respond. Pointing was coded 
when children extended their finger(s) and/or hand(s) toward the marble and/or apparatus 
either in front of or through the mesh. If there was an interval of at least one second between 
different instances of a manipulation, iconic gesture, or point two separate behaviors were 
coded. The amount of time the experimenter (baiter or helper) stayed at the table was also 
recorded in order to calculate the rate (frequency per minute) of pointing, iconic gesturing, 
and apparatus manipulation.   
To assess inter-rater reliability, a coder who was naïve to the hypotheses of the study 
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coded 25% of the children at each age. Reliability was excellent (Spearman's rank correlation: 
average of time experimenter was present (sec): rs=0.913; sum of points: rs=0.905; sum of 
apparatus manipulations: rs=0.947; sum of turning tube: rs=0.939; sum of pushing box: 
rs=0.851; sum of gestures: rs=0.895; sum of turning gestures: rs=0.908; sum of pushing 
gestures: rs=0.848, P<0.0001 in all cases).  
We analyzed the three main dependent variables as a function of condition, type of 
apparatus, and age group. We analyzed whether individuals preferentially used those actions 
(either gestures or manipulations) that the experimenter needed to extract the reward from the 
apparatus. To be able to combine (and compare) the data from the two apparatuses, we 
considered turning the tube and pushing the box as appropriate actions when the 
corresponding duplicate apparatus at the experimenter’s side was baited (e.g., pushing when 
the reward was in the box) and turning the tube and pushing the box as inappropriate actions 
when the other apparatus was baited at the experimenter’s side. We used non-parametric 
statistics because the data failed to meet the normality assumption for parametric statistics. 
 
Results 
Iconic gestures 
Overall, both 2- and 3-year-old children gestured iconically significantly more often 
when the reward was inside the helper’s apparatus (necessary condition) than when it was 
outside the apparatus (unnecessary condition) (Wilcoxon test: 2-year-olds: T=28, P=0.016, 
N=7(1 tie); 3-year-olds: T=36, P=0.008, N=8). The 2-year-olds produced 1.0 iconic gestures 
per minute, and the 3-year-olds produced 1.63 iconic gestures per minute, in the necessary 
condition and almost none (0.02 iconic gestures per minute for both 2- and 3-year-olds) in the 
unnecessary condition. All children except one 2-year-old produced at least one iconic gesture 
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in the necessary condition whereas only one 2-year-old and one 3-year-old produced one 
iconic gesture in the unnecessary condition. There were no significant differences in iconic 
gesture rate between age groups in either condition (Mann-Whitney test: necessary condition: 
U=24, P=0.44, N=16, unnecessary condition: U=31.5, P=0.96, N=16). 
Since iconic gestures occurred almost exclusively in the necessary condition, the 
subsequent analysis focused on this condition only. Figure 2 presents the iconic gesture rate as 
a function of type of apparatus (tube/box), type of iconic gesture produced (turning/pushing), 
and age group. The 3-year-old children consistently produced iconic gestures that matched the 
action that was required to extract the reward. In particular, they preferentially displayed 
turning (as opposed to pushing) when the reward was in the tube (Wilcoxon test: T=36, 
P=0.008, N=8) and conversely, they preferentially displayed pushing (as opposed to turning) 
when the reward was in the box (Wilcoxon test: T=36, P=0.008, N=8). 
The 2-year-old children showed the same pattern of results, but to a slightly weaker 
degree. Thus, although they also preferentially displayed turning when the reward was in the 
tube (Wilcoxon test: T=28, P=0.016, N=7(1 tie)) they only showed a trend to use pushing 
more often than turning when the reward was in the box (Wilcoxon test: T=25, P=0.078, 
N=7(1 tie)). Nevertheless, combining the data from both apparatuses revealed that, overall, 
both 2- and 3-year-old children produced a significantly higher rate of appropriate than 
inappropriate iconic gestures (Wilcoxon test: 2-year-olds: T=28, P=0.016, N=7(1 tie); 3-year-
olds: T=36, P=0.008, N=8).  The two age groups did not differ significantly in their rates of 
turning or pushing for either the tube (Mann-Whitney test: turning: U=25, P=0.51 N=16, 
pushing: U=24, P=0.44, N=16) or the box (Mann-Whitney test: turning: U=29, P=0.80, N=16, 
pushing: U=16, P=0.11, N=16).  
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Figure 2 
------------- 
Pointing 
Figure 3 presents the pointing rate as a function of condition, apparatus, and age. 
Overall, both 2- and 3-year-old children pointed at comparable rates in both conditions, that 
is, they each pointed roughly 2 to 2.5 times per minute in each condition (Wilcoxon test: 2-
year-olds: T=24, P=0.46, N=8; 3-year-olds: T=23, P=0.55, N=8). However, 3-year-olds 
pointed more often in the unnecessary than the necessary condition with the tube apparatus 
(Wilcoxon test: T=35, P=0.016, N=8).  
There were no significant differences in pointing rate between 2- and 3-year-old 
children in the necessary (Mann-Whitney test: U=32, P=1.00, N=16) or the unnecessary 
condition (Mann-Whitney test: U=29, P=0.80, N=16).  
------------- 
Figure 3 
------------- 
 
Apparatus manipulations 
Overall, both 2- and 3-year-old children manipulated the apparatuses at comparable 
rates in the necessary and unnecessary conditions (Wilcoxon test: 2-year-olds: T=15, P=0.94, 
N=7 (1 tie);  3-year-olds: T=12, P=0.31, N=5 (3 ties)). The 2-year-olds manipulated the 
apparatus 2.0 times per minute in the necessary condition and 2.45 times per minute in the 
unnecessary condition. The 3-year-olds manipulated the apparatus 2.3 times per minute in the 
necessary condition and 2.35 times per minute in the unnecessary condition. There were no 
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significant differences in manipulation rate between 2- and 3-year-old children in either the 
necessary (Mann-Whitney test: U=30.50, P=0.88, N=16) or the unnecessary condition (Mann-
Whitney test: U=29, P=0.80, N=16). 
Figure 4 presents the manipulation rate as a function of condition, type of apparatus, 
type of manipulation (turning/pushing), and age. In the necessary condition (Figure 4a), 
neither 2-year-olds (Wilcoxon test: tube: T=15, P=0.063, N=5 (3 ties); box: T=10, P=0.63, 
N=5 (3 ties)) nor 3-year-olds (Wilcoxon test: tube: T=10, P=0.125, N=4 (4 ties); box: T=14, 
P=0.125, N=5 (3 ties)) showed any significant differences in the use of turning vs. pushing for 
either apparatus. Combining the data from both apparatuses revealed that, overall, both 2- and 
3-year-old children produced appropriate and inappropriate manipulations at an 
approximately equal rate (Wilcoxon test: 2-year-olds: T=22, P=0.22, N=7 (1 tie); 3-year-olds: 
T=14, P=0.125, N=5 (3 ties)). 
Similarly, in the unnecessary condition (Figure 4b) neither 2-year-olds (Wilcoxon test: 
tube:  T=6, P=0.88, N=4(4 ties); box: T=15, P=0.44, N=6 (2 ties)) nor 3-year-olds (Wilcoxon 
test: tube: T=3.5, P=0.75, N=3 (5 ties); box: T=8.5, P=0.81, N=5 (3 ties)) showed any 
significant differences in the use of turning vs. pushing for either apparatus. Combining the 
data from both apparatuses revealed that, overall, both 2- and 3-year-old children produced 
appropriate and inappropriate manipulations at an approximately equal rate (Wilcoxon test: 2-
year-olds: T=17, P=0.22, N=6 (2 ties); 3-year-olds: T=8, P=1.0, N=5 (3 ties)).  
------------- 
Figure 4 
------------- 
Neither age group showed a significant preference for using apparatus manipulations 
over iconic gestures in the necessary condition (Wilcoxon test: 2-year-olds: T=22, P=0.56, 
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N=8; 3-year-olds: T=18, P=1.0, N=8). Additionally, we found no conclusive evidence of a 
trade-off between apparatus manipulations and iconic gestures when the two age groups were 
analyzed separately (Spearman test:  2-year-olds: r=-0.26, P=0.53, N=8; 3-year-olds: r=-0.49, 
P=0.22, N=8).  However, when we analyzed both groups together, we found that the higher 
the rate of iconic gestures, the lower the rate of apparatus manipulations (Spearman r=-0.51, 
P=0.04, N=16). 
Discussion 
In line with our hypotheses, children used appropriate iconic gestures (i.e., turning 
when the reward was in the tube and pushing when the reward was in the box) in the 
necessary condition. This was especially true of 3-year-olds, but also, to a slightly lesser 
degree, of 2-year-olds. In contrast, children hardly ever used iconic gestures in the 
unnecessary condition, in which they were not needed. Instead, children of both ages quite 
often pointed in the unnecessary condition (children often pointed in the necessary condition 
as well, and this was to be expected because pointing provided some information in that 
condition too, i.e., about the fact that a marble was in the apparatus). In short, children of both 
ages pointed when that might be effective, but also used iconic gestures appropriately when 
they were needed. 
Although the pattern of apparatus manipulations in the necessary condition (unlike 
that in the unnecessary condition) mirrored that of the iconic gestures, children did not use 
appropriate apparatus manipulations at a significant level (i.e., turning the tube and pushing 
the box when the reward was in the tube and box, respectively), partly because about half of 
the children displayed the same rates for turning and pushing for each apparatus. Thus, 
children manipulated the apparatus but they did not seem to use it to show the adult what to 
do.  One reason for this might be that children find iconic gestures natural for symbolization, 
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but they find it difficult to use objects as symbols due to what DeLoache (2004) has called the 
dual representation problem. In her studies using replicas and scale models, DeLoache finds 
that it is mostly not until children are 3 years of age or older that they really can understand 
one object (which has its own properties as a physical object) as symbolizing another. A 
second possibility is that as children get older they are less flexible in using communicative 
means other than those they normally use (see Namy & Waxman, 1998, for evidence for this 
effect in the way that young children use either gestures or words to designate objects). 
However, note that we found no preference for iconic gestures over apparatus manipulations 
in either of the age groups and a trade-off between iconic gestures and apparatus 
manipulations when all children were pooled together. Although iconic gestures may have 
carried the weight of the communicative exchanges with the experimenter, it is conceivable 
that the role of apparatus manipulations was not completely negligible as a communicative 
device. Future studies should further investigate this issue.  
 
Study 2: Apes 
Method 
Participants 
Nine chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and four bonobos (Pan paniscus) of various ages 
participated (see Table 1). An additional bonobo female was tested but was not included in 
the analyses due to lack of participation. Both species were socially housed in enclosures in 
the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center with both outdoor and indoor areas that were 
equipped with climbing structures and natural vegetation. They were fed four times a day on a 
diet of fruit, vegetables, and chow, and water was available ad libitum. All apes were mother-
reared except Limbuko and Kuno, who were nursery-reared by humans, and Alex, who had 
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been human-reared and trained until he was 3 years, 3 months of age together with two other 
chimpanzees (not included in the current study) before he was integrated into a social group 
composed of six individuals. All apes were used to selecting between alternatives (e.g., a 
choice between a baited and an empty cup) by touch or by proximally pointing to them.  
Moreover, all apes except Luiza, Gertruida, Fifi, and Jahaga had been involved in studies that 
tested the production and comprehension of pointing to objects (Bullinger et al., 2011; 
Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005; Zimmermann et al., 2009). 
 
Materials and set-up 
The apparatuses (Figure 1) and set-up were very similar to those used in Study 1 
(except that of course the mesh was made of metal). Instead of marbles, grapes were used as 
rewards. 
 
Design 
Apes participated in the same experimental conditions (unnecessary, necessary) 
and the baseline period but they received more trials than children.  Apes were tested on 
four days within two weeks, with one session per day. In each of the four sessions they 
received eight test trials, four with each apparatus, two in the unnecessary and two in the 
necessary condition, in alternating order, for a total of 32 trials. As with children, in the 
second and third sessions a duplicate of each apparatus was fixed on the apes’ side of the 
mesh. 
 
Procedure 
 Like children, apes began by learning how the apparatuses worked. Both apparatuses 
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were attached to the mesh in their enclosure and apes were allowed to manipulate them to 
figure out how to get the grape out. Before going on to the test phase, apes had to obtain the 
grape successfully 35 times from each apparatus over the course of 3 days. By the end of 
these trials, all apes had figured out how to open the apparatuses relatively quickly, within 
approximately 5 seconds. 
 At the beginning of each session there were 3 helping trials, to show apes that the 
helper was willing to help them. For each of these trials, the baiter placed a grape on the table 
and then, unlike with children, left the room. After 60 seconds, the helper came in, gave apes 
the grape through the mesh, and left again.  
The baiter then put a grape either in front of the apparatus on the table (unnecessary 
condition) or inside the apparatus (necessary condition), and left the room for the baseline 
period, which lasted 60 seconds. The helper then returned for the test. The helper behaved in 
exactly the same way as with children except that the response periods lasted longer than with 
children. That is, in the unnecessary condition, if apes pointed to the grape the helper gave it 
to them after 60 seconds. If apes did not point to the grape, the helper waited for 60 seconds 
without giving the grape. In the necessary condition, if apes pointed to the grape the helper 
demonstrated that she was unable to reach it and waited 2 minutes for apes to gesture 
iconically, or to manipulate the corresponding duplicate apparatus on their side if it was 
present. If apes did not act in any relevant way in this condition, after 30 seconds the helper 
began to try to manipulate the apparatus unsuccessfully. If apes did not react at all, after a 
total of 60 seconds the helper left the room. If apes started acting (pointing, gesturing, or 
manipulating the duplicate apparatus), the helper stayed for a total of two minutes. 
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Coding and analyses 
Coding was done as with children. To assess inter-rater reliability, a coder who was 
naïve to the hypotheses of the study coded 30% of the chimpanzees and 25% of the bonobos.  
Reliability was excellent (Spearman's rank correlation: average of time experimenter was 
present (sec): rs=0.913;  sum of points: rs=0.93; sum of apparatus manipulations: rs=0.977; 
sum of turning tube: rs=0.947; sum of pushing box: rs=0.881, P<0.0001 in all cases, N=128).  
The correlation for sum of gestures, turning gestures, and pushing gestures could not be 
calculated because subjects did not gesture – and both coders agreed in 100% of the trials. 
Data were analyzed in the same way as with children except that we did not analyze 
the performance of bonobos separately because the small sample size (N=4) made the 
interpretation of the tests meaningless. In this study we also compared apes’ performance in 
the experimental period to their performance in the baseline period (we did not do this 
comparison for children in Study 1 because having the baiter stay in the room was not an ideal 
situation for a baseline period; it was done only for practical reasons so as not to leave 
children alone in the room). This comparison informs us about how communicative apes’ 
gestures were in the experimental conditions, although it should be noted that the baseline 
period was not a counterbalanced condition but always came first. 
 
Results 
Iconic gestures 
Twelve of the 13 apes failed to use any iconic gestures at any time during the 
experiment. The one exception was the human-raised and trained chimpanzee, Alex. In the 
necessary condition only, and mostly with the tube apparatus (2.1 times per minute with the 
tube apparatus and 0.1 times per minute with the box apparatus), Alex cocked his head in a 
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kind of turning motion. Of course this is not demonstrating exactly what the human should do 
– the human should use her hands to turn the apparatus (as Alex himself had done in 
manipulating his apparatus) – but still the head movement did create a turning, rotational 
motion. To test the hypothesis that Alex was simply making a motion relevant to what he 
would do if he had access to the apparatus, we looked at what he did in the baseline condition 
when he was alone in the room. He never once used this tilting head motion during the 
baseline period. 
 
Pointing 
Figure 5 presents the pointing rate as a function of condition, type of apparatus, and 
species. Overall, chimpanzees pointed at comparable rates in the unnecessary and necessary 
conditions (Wilcoxon test: T=33, P=0.25, N=9). However, their pointing rate was 
significantly higher in the experimental than the baseline period for both the unnecessary 
(Wilcoxon test: T=45, P=0.004, N=9; Median: Baseline=0.0; Experimental=2.44) and 
necessary conditions (Wilcoxon test: T=45, P=0.004, N=9; Median: Baseline=0.0; 
Experimental=2.24). There were no significant differences in pointing rate between 
chimpanzees and bonobos in the necessary condition (Mann-Whitney test: U=13, P=0.50, 
N=13), but chimpanzees showed a lower pointing rate than bonobos in the unnecessary 
condition (Mann-Whitney test: U=5, P=0.05, N=13).  
------------- 
Figure 5 
------------- 
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Apparatus manipulations 
Overall, chimpanzees manipulated the apparatus in their enclosure at comparable rates 
in both conditions (Wilcoxon test: T=33, P=0.25, N=9). The chimpanzees manipulated the 
apparatus 2.52 times per minute in the necessary condition and 1.94 times per minute in the 
unnecessary condition.  There were no significant differences in manipulation rate between 
chimpanzees and bonobos in the necessary condition (Mann-Whitney test: U=10, P=0.26, 
N=13), but chimpanzees showed a significantly higher manipulation rate than bonobos in the 
unnecessary condition (Mann-Whitney test: U=3, P=0.02, N=13). 
Figure 6 presents the manipulation rate as a function of condition, type of apparatus, 
type of manipulation (turning/pushing), and species.  Focusing on the necessary condition 
(Figure 6a), chimpanzees used turning significantly more often than pushing with the tube 
apparatus (Wilcoxon test: T=41, P=0.027, N=9) but the reverse was not true for the box 
apparatus (Wilcoxon test: T=25, P=0.82, N=9). However, combining the data from both 
apparatuses revealed that, overall, chimpanzees produced more appropriate than inappropriate 
manipulations (Wilcoxon test: T=45, P=0.004, N=9). 
In contrast, they did not produce more appropriate than inappropriate manipulations 
during the baseline period (Wilcoxon test: T=25, P=0.82, N=9).  More importantly, a direct 
comparison between the percentage of appropriate actions used during the experimental and 
baseline periods revealed that chimpanzees produced a higher percentage of appropriate 
manipulations in the experimental than the baseline periods (Wilcoxon test: T=45, P=0.004, 
N=9; Median: Baseline=40.1%; experimental=70.5%).   
------------- 
Figure 6 
------------- 
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In the unnecessary condition (Figure 6b), chimpanzees showed no significant 
differences in the use of turning vs. pushing for either apparatus (Wilcoxon tests: tube: T=38, 
P=0.074, N=9; box: T=33, P=0.25, N=9). Moreover, combining the data from both 
apparatuses did not change the results since, overall, chimpanzees did not produce 
significantly more appropriate than inappropriate manipulations (Wilcoxon test: T=38, 
P=0.074, N=9). Similarly, chimpanzees exhibited a comparable rate of appropriate and 
inappropriate manipulations during the baseline period for this condition (Wilcoxon test: 
T=19, P=0.95, N=8).   
Complicating matters, chimpanzees showed a trend toward more appropriate 
manipulations in the experimental than in the baseline period, even though the human did not 
need to manipulate the apparatus in the unnecessary condition (Wilcoxon test: T=39, 
P=0.055, N=9; Median: Baseline=43.7%; experimental=60.8%). However, they produced 
more appropriate actions in the necessary than the unnecessary condition of the experimental 
period (Wilcoxon test: T=40, P=0.039, N=9), but the same was not true during the baseline 
period (Wilcoxon test: T=28, P=0.57, N=9). 
Chimpanzees used turning significantly more often than bonobos in the unnecessary 
condition (Mann-Whitney test: U=5.5, P=0.050, N=13). There were no other significant 
differences between species in any other combination of variables (Mann-Whitney tests: U>8, 
P>0.19, N=13 in all cases). 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the two experiments. In general, both children and 
apes used pointing and apparatus manipulation but only children used iconic gestures. Most of 
the pointing gestures appeared when no specific instruction on how to manipulate the 
apparatus was needed (unnecessary condition). In contrast, apparatus manipulations, and 
especially iconic gestures, were more frequent when the experimenter needed instruction. If 
Iconic gestures  23 
 
the analyses are restricted to appropriate apparatus manipulations and iconic gestures (rather 
than all apparatus manipulations and iconic gestures) the results remain largely unchanged. 
------------- 
Table 2 
------------- 
Discussion 
With one possible exception, neither chimpanzees nor bonobos used any iconic 
gestures. The exception was the human-reared chimpanzee Alex, who repeatedly produced a 
kind of tilting head motion in the necessary condition, especially for the tube apparatus for 
which turning was appropriate, but he never produced this gesture when alone. As the human 
tilting her head in imitation of Alex would produce no relevant effects, if Alex intended his 
head motion to be communicative then it would have to symbolize the turning of the tube that 
would be effective. In contrast to the near absence of iconic gestures, many chimpanzees and 
bonobos pointed to the food for the human to show their desire for it. This shows that they 
were motivated for the food, and that they were capable of communicating with humans in 
order to get it. Something about iconic gestures, then, would seem to be especially difficult 
for great apes, perhaps because iconic gestures require a matching of specific actions between 
self and other, as in action imitation, which all apes find difficult (Buttelmann, Carpenter, 
Call, & Tomasello, 2013; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009). 
 Despite their lack of iconic gestures, chimpanzees produced more appropriate than 
inappropriate apparatus manipulations in the necessary condition, and did not do this in the 
unnecessary condition. They also produced more appropriate apparatus manipulations in the 
necessary than the unnecessary condition. The question is whether they were using these 
manipulations to communicate to the human what she should do, or, alternatively, whether 
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they were simply (non-communicatively) performing on the duplicate apparatus the actions 
they would perform if they had the baited apparatus available to them. The baseline period 
becomes important here because if the chimpanzees were communicating to the human, then 
they should only perform apparatus manipulations when the human was present, or at least 
they should favor the production of appropriate over inappropriate apparatus manipulations 
only when the human was present (although recall that the baseline period was not a 
counterbalanced condition but always came first). Looking at the necessary condition, it was 
indeed the case that chimpanzees produced a higher percentage of appropriate actions when 
the experimenter was present than absent.  However, they also tended to produce more 
appropriate than inappropriate actions when the experimenter was present rather than absent 
in the unnecessary condition.  This is somehow problematic because the whole notion of 
appropriate and inappropriate is not really applicable here, since human apparatus 
manipulations would produce no relevant effects (the reward was outside the apparatus). 
In sum, great apes pointed to the grape but they did not readily produce iconic 
gestures, and even Alex's head tilting was not a straightforward symbolizing of what the 
human should do.  The apparatus manipulations, which possibly were produced 
communicatively, represent an intriguing finding to which we return in the general discussion. 
 
General Discussion 
In the current study the general finding was as hypothesized: the children fairly readily 
gestured for the helper both iconically and deictically, appropriate to the situation, whereas 
the apes (with one possible exception) only used pointing gestures and did not gesture 
iconically.  The one possible exception in the use of iconic gestures was the only human-
raised ape, the chimpanzee Alex, who tilted his head for the experimenter in the necessary 
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condition for the tube apparatus – perhaps showing how the tube should go. Interestingly, 
Alex was raised by humans from birth, which may have influenced his communicative 
abilities with humans (Call & Tomasello, 1996), but perhaps even more importantly, Alex had 
previously been extensively trained to imitate humans in a “Do As I Do” paradigm (Hribar, 
Sonesson, & Call, 2014). This training does not translate directly to the current experimental 
situation, as the training involved Alex copying human actions, and in the current experiment 
there were no human actions to copy. Instead, Alex had to transform his previous learning – if 
that is what he did – by now, in essence, asking the human to imitate him. In any case, it is 
possible that Alex’s training in matching actions with others led him to produce an action that, 
indirectly at least (his head symbolizing not the human’s action but the tube’s), was intended 
to communicate iconically. 
Of course, it is possible that something else was going on, especially since Alex only 
did anything iconic for one of the two apparatuses. But, importantly, Alex did not tilt his head 
at all in the baseline period. A skeptic might argue that social facilitation could have been at 
work here: Alex was more aroused and so simply acted more when he was in the presence of 
others. However, this cannot be the full explanation because the specific action that increased 
(i.e., tilting the head like the tube should be tilted) was appropriate to the situation, and in 
addition in the two other situations in which the experimenter was present Alex did not 
behave in this manner:  He rarely tilted his head in this way with the box apparatus and never 
did so in the unnecessary condition. In any case, regardless of whether this single action was 
an iconic gesture or not, the fact remains that none of the other apes produced these types of 
gestures, despite being clearly motivated to obtain the reward and perfectly capable of 
communicating with the human by other means – pointing – to request it.  
Interestingly, chimpanzees produced more appropriate than inappropriate apparatus 
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manipulations in the necessary condition when the experimenter was present. Additionally, 
they produced a higher percentage of appropriate apparatus manipulations when the 
experimenter was present rather than absent, especially when the experimenter needed those 
manipulations to retrieve the reward. Again the question is whether or not these apparatus 
manipulations were produced to communicate to the experimenter what she should do with 
the apparatus.  
One possible interpretation of these results is that the apparatus manipulations were 
not communicative but instead simply reflected a differential activation of appropriate 
behaviors in the presence of the experimenter when the grape was inside the apparatus. It is 
unclear however, what the mechanism for such an activation would be. Another possibility is 
that the presence of the experimenter directing her actions at one of the apparatuses triggered 
in the chimpanzees some kind of motor anticipation for how one would manipulate the 
experimenter's apparatus in order to extract the food. Future studies should investigate these 
possibilities. 
On the other hand, it could be that both children and chimpanzees were 
communicating with the experimenter to inform her about how to operate the apparatus, but 
they differed in their preferred means of communication: Whereas children used iconic 
gestures, chimpanzees used apparatus manipulations. If this were the case, it would have 
important implications for the evolution of human communication, particularly with regard to 
iconic gestures, because it would highlight both the similarities and differences between 
humans and one of our closest living primate relatives. That is, chimpanzees would be similar 
to humans in that they may share with humans the ability to request specific actions from 
others by enacting them, but different in that this ability is only expressed in the presence of a 
suitable physical support.  
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We tried to code eye contact between apes and the experimenter as a way to determine 
apes’ communicative intent. Although we witnessed some clear cases in which apes 
established eye contact while manipulating the apparatus, we were unable to code eye contact 
reliably due to non-ideal filming conditions. Another way to investigate whether apes’ 
apparatus manipulations were communicative could be to use an apparatus amenable to 
gestural elaboration. Cartmill and Byrne (2007) have reported gestural elaboration by 
orangutans as a function of the level of comprehension of a recipient of those gestures. If one 
could find that apes tailor the type of apparatus manipulation they make to the observer’s skill 
level, this would be strong support for a communicative account of these apparatus 
manipulations. 
The importance of a physical support has been documented in several areas, including 
goal attribution and, again, imitation. With regard to goal attribution, Call, Hare, Carpenter, 
and Tomasello (2004) found that chimpanzees could more easily distinguish between an 
experimenter who was unwilling versus unable to give them a grape when the experimenter’s 
behavior involved actions on the physical world. With regard to imitation, several studies in 
which apes have been trained to imitate on command have reported that actions that have a 
clearly specified physical end point (e.g., touching the top of the head with a hand) are easier 
for apes to imitate than those that lack a physical end point (e.g., raising a hand in the air) 
(Call, 2001; Custance, Whiten, & Bard, 1995; Myowa-Yamakoshi & Matsuzawa, 1999). Call 
(2001) has argued that the existence of a physical end point provides scaffolding for 
interpreting and copying those actions. In a similar way, the duplicate apparatus provided to 
apes in the current study could have scaffolded their communication, allowing them to 
communicate in a more concrete, less imaginary way than would be the case with iconic 
gestures. Again, raising parallels to imitation, it could be that the apparatus manipulations 
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were analogous to emulation (i.e., showing how the object works) whereas iconic gestures 
would have been more analogous to imitation of actions (see Carpenter & Call, 2009, for 
more on the tendency for apes to emulate rather than imitate). 
Overall, then, the current results demonstrate very clearly that iconic gestures come 
naturally to human children in a way that they do not to the great apes. If we accept that the 
apparatus manipulations were truly communicative, it is possible that apes’ lack of iconic 
gestures is related to their difficulties with action matching and imitation (e.g., Buttelmann et 
al., 2013), and not with an inability to communicate (request) precise courses of action from 
others in novel ways.  But it is also possible that the apparatus manipulations were not truly 
communicative, and that great apes' problems with iconic gestures stemmed from an inability 
to comprehend that one may communicate with others by symbolizing (by whatever means) 
(see, e.g., Cartmill, Beilock, & Goldin-Meadow, 2012; Tomasello, 2008). In either case, the 
facility of young children with iconic gestures is brought into sharp relief by documenting 
how difficult this form of communication is for our nearest primate relatives. But the 
possibility that apes can use other means of communication with proper scaffolding is an 
intriguing finding that should be followed up to determine more specifically what the apes 
were trying to do. 
 
Iconic gestures  29 
 
References 
Behne, T., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (in press). Young children create iconic gestures 
to inform others. Developmental Psychology. 
Bullinger, A., Zimmermann, F., Kaminski, J., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Different social 
motives in the gestural communication of chimpanzees and human children. 
Developmental Science, 14, 58-68. 
Buttelmann, D., Carpenter, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2013). Chimpanzees, Pan 
troglodytes, recognize successful actions but fail to imitate them. Animal Behaviour, 86, 
755-761. 
Call, J. (2001).  Body imitation in an enculturated orangutan.  Cybernetics and Systems, 32, 
97-119. 
Call, J., Hare, B., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2004). 'Unwilling' versus 'unable': 
Chimpanzees' understanding of human intentions. Developmental Science, 7, 488-498. 
Call, J. & Tomasello, M. (1994).  Production and comprehension of referential pointing by 
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus).  Journal of Comparative Psychology, 108, 307-317.  
Call, J. & Tomasello, M. (1996). The effect of humans on the cognitive development of apes. 
In A.E. Russon, K.A. Bard & S.T. Parker (Eds.). Reaching into thought (pp. 371-403). 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Call, J. & Tomasello, M.  (2007). Comparing the gestural repertoire of apes.  In J. Call & M. 
Tomasello (Eds.). The gestural communication of apes and monkeys (pp. 197-220).  
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Carpenter, M. & Call, J. (2009).  Comparing the imitative skills of children and nonhuman 
apes.  Revue de Primatologie [online], 1. http://primatologie.revues.org/263 
Carpenter, M., Nagell, K., & Tomasello, M. (1998). Social cognition, joint attention, and 
Iconic gestures  30 
 
communicative competence from 9 to 15 months of age. Monographs of the Society for 
Research in Child Development, 63 (4, Serial No. 255). 
Cartmill, E. A., Beilock, S., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (2012). A word in the hand: Action, 
gesture, and mental representation in humans and non-human primates. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society, Series B, 367, 129-143.  
Cartmill, E. A. & Byrne, R. W. (2007). Orangutans modify their gestural signalling according 
to their audience's comprehension. Current Biology, 17, 1345–1348. 
Custance, D.M., Whiten, A. & Bard, K.A. (1995). Can young chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) 
imitate arbitrary actions? Hayes and Hayes (1952) revisited. Behaviour, 132, 837–859. 
DeLoache, J. (2004). Becoming symbol-minded. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 66-70. 
Gardner, R.A., Gardner, B.T. & Van Cantfort, T.E. (1989).  Teaching sign language to 
chimpanzees.  New York: SUNY. 
Gómez, J.C. (1990).  The emergence of intentional communication as a problem-solving 
strategy in the gorilla. In S.T. Parker & K.R. Gibson (Eds.) "Language" and intelligence 
in monkeys and apes.  Comparative developmental perspectives (pp. 333-355).  New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hribar, A., Sonesson, G. & Call, J. (2014).  From sign to action. Studies in chimpanzee 
pictorial competence. Semiotica,198, 205–240. 
Kita, S. (Ed.). (2003). Pointing: Where language, culture, and cognition meet. Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum.   
Leavens, D.A & Hopkins, W.D. (1998). Intentional communication by chimpanzees: a cross-
sectional study of the use of referential gestures. Developmental Psychology, 34, 813–
822. 
Leavens, D.A., Hopkins, W.D. & Bard, K.A. (1996). Indexical and referential pointing in 
Iconic gestures  31 
 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 110, 346–353. 
Leavens, D.A., Hopkins, W.D. & Thomas, R.K. (2004). Referential communication by 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 118, 48–57. 
McNeill, D. (1992). Hand and mind: What gestures reveal about thought. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Myowa-Yamakoshi, M. & Matsuzawa, T. (1999).  Factors influencing imitation of 
manipulatory actions in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).  Journal of Comparative 
Psychology, 113, 128-136. 
Namy, L. & Waxman, S. R. (1998). Words and gestures: Infants’ interpretations of different 
forms of symbolic reference. Child Development, 69, 295-308. 
Nicoladis, E., Mayberry, R. I., & Genesee, F. (1999). Gesture and early bilingual 
development. Developmental Psychology, 35(2), 514-526. 
Özçalişkan, Ş., Gentner, D., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (in press). Do iconic gestures pave the 
way for children’s early verbs? Applied Psycholinguistics. 
Özçalişkan, Ş., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (2011). Is there an iconic gesture spurt at 26 months? In 
G. Stam & M. Ishino (Eds.), Integrating gestures: The interdisciplinary nature of 
gesture (pp. 163-174). Amsterdam, NL: John Benjamins. 
Pika, S., Liebal, K. & Tomasello, M. (2003). Gestural communication in young gorillas 
(Gorilla gorilla): Gestural repertoire, learning and use. American Journal of 
Primatology, 60, 95-111. 
Pika, S., Liebal, K. & Tomasello, M. (2005). Gestural communication in subadult bonobos 
(Pan paniscus): Gestural repertoire and use. American Journal of Primatology, 65, 39-
51. 
Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. (1986). Ape language: From conditioned response to symbol. New 
Iconic gestures  32 
 
York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Savage-Rumbaugh, E.S., Wilkerson, B.J. & Bakeman, R. (1977). Spontaneous gestural 
communication among conspecifics in the pygmy chimpanzee (Pan paniscus).  In G.H. 
Bourne (Ed).  Progress in ape research (pp. 97-116).  New York: Academic Press. 
So, W. C., Demir, Ö. E., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (2010). When speech is ambiguous, gesture 
steps in: Sensitivity to discourse-pragmatic principles in early childhood. Applied 
Psycholinguistics, 31(1), 209-224. 
Stefanini, S., Bello, A., Caselli, M. C., Iverson, J. M., & Volterra, V. (2009). Co-speech 
gestures in a naming task: Developmental data. Language and Cognitive Processes, 24, 
168-189. 
Tanner, J. E. & Byrne, R.W. (1996). Representation of action through iconic gesture in a 
captive lowland gorilla.  Current Anthropology, 37, 162-173. 
Tennie, C.; Call, J. & Tomasello, M. (2009). Ratcheting up the ratchet: On the evolution of 
cumulative culture. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: 
Biological Sciences, 364, 2405-2415.  
Tomasello, M. (2008). The origins of human communication. MIT Press.  
Tomasello, M., & Carpenter, M. (2005). The emergence of social cognition in three young 
chimpanzees. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 70 (1, 
Serial No. 279). 
Zimmermann, F., Zemke, F., Call, J. & Gómez, J.C. (2009).  Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) 
and bonobos (Pan paniscus) point to inform a human about the location of a tool.  
Animal Cognition, 12, 347-358. 
 
  
Iconic gestures  33 
 
Table 1: Apes who participated in Study 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Species Name Sex Age at the time of testing 
 
Bonobos Luiza female 6 
 Yasa female 10 
 Kuno male 11 
 Limbuko male 12 
 
Chimpanzees Tai 
 
female 8 
 Pia female 11 
 Sandra female 17 
 Gertruida female 17 
 Fifi female 17 
 Jahaga female 18 
 Lome male 9 
 Alex male 10 
 Patrick male 13 
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Table 2: Mean number ± SEM (per min and trial) of gestures and apparatus manipulations in 
children and apes as a function of whether instructions to the experimenter were necessary or 
unnecessary. 
 
 
  
   
Gestures 
  
 
 
Apparatus Manipulation 
   
Iconic 
  
Pointing 
 
 
Group 
  
Necessary 
 
Unnecessary 
  
Necessary 
 
Unnecessary 
  
Necessary 
 
Unnecessary 
          
Children          
2-year-olds  1.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.0)  2.0 (0.4) 2.4 (0.5)  1.3 (0.4) 1.3 (0.5) 
3-year-olds  1.6 (0.4) 0.0 (0.0)  2.3 (0.4) 2.4 (0.5)  1.7 (0.6) 1.1 (0.5) 
          
Apes          
Chimpanzees  0.1 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0)  2.8 (0.8) 3.2 (0.8)  2.9 (0.4) 2.4 (0.4) 
Bonobos  0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)  3.7 (1.5) 7.4 (1.9)  1.8 (0.5) 0.8 (0.1) 
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Figure 1. Different views of the apparatuses used with children and apes:  a) the tube, b) the 
box. 
a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) 
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Figure 2. Mean (SEM) number of turning and pushing gestures per minute (and trial) as a 
function of apparatus type and age group in the necessary condition for children. Asterisks 
indicate a significant difference between conditions (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01). 
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Figure 3. Mean number of pointing gestures per minute (and trial) as a function of condition, 
apparatus type, and age group for children. Asterisk indicates a significant difference between 
conditions (* p < 0.05). 
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Figure 4. Mean (SEM) number of turning and pushing apparatus manipulations per minute 
(and trial) as a function of apparatus type and age group in the a) necessary and b) 
unnecessary conditions for children.  
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Figure 5. Mean number of pointing gestures per minute (and trial) as a function of condition, 
apparatus type, and species for apes.  
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Figure 6. Mean (SEM) number of turning and pushing apparatus manipulations per minute 
(and trial) as a function of apparatus type and species in the necessary (a) and unnecessary (b) 
conditions for apes. Asterisk indicates a significant difference between conditions (*p < 0.05). 
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